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Epidemics have accompanied wars since antiquity. They have
often influenced the outcome of battles and military cam-
paigns, and have occurred among both soldiers and civilians.
Favourable conditions for their emergence result from the
destruction caused by fighting, the social disorganization and
collapse of health systems, the slackening of hygiene and pre-
vention of infectious diseases, and the weakening of popula-
tions, including by nutritional deficiency and deterioration in
access to safe drinking water. Pathogens have also been used
as biological weapons. Soldiers have sometimes been unin-
tentional vectors of infections that have spread to the civilian
population.
In the seventh century, smallpox spread through North
Africa, and thereafter through Europe with the Islamic
armies [1].
There is presently little evidence of a significant relation-
ship between soldiers and the spread of HIV [2]. However,
military personnel have long been considered to constitute a
high-risk population for sexually transmitted infection (includ-
ing HIV in sub-Saharan Africa [3]), because they stay for long
periods far from their home, they have frequent commercial
sex, a feeling of invulnerability, and risk-taking behaviours,
and they are potentially prone to coercive sex. For the
record, the French troops that invaded Naples, Italy in 1495
were responsible for the first European epidemic of syphilis,
initially known as the ‘Neapolitan disease’ in France and the
‘French disease’ in the rest of Europe.
The spread of the 1918 influenza pandemic was facilitated
by the crowded conditions of military camps and troop
movements from the USA and probably Indochina to France
during World War I. Some authors suggest that the ‘Spanish’
influenza had its origin in the winter of 1917, in and around
military camps in northern France, where overcrowding, live
pigs, geese, ducks and chickens, and mutagenic chemical
weapons, could have contributed to the emergence of the
pandemic virus [4].
Although the Republic of Korea had been declared ‘malaria-
free’ in 1979, Plasmodium vivax malaria re-emerged in 1993 in
the military population near the demilitarized zone (DMZ). In
the following years, it rapidly spread and increased exponen-
tially in the military, veteran and civilian populations, despite
the implementation in the army of mandatory chloroquine
chemoprophylaxis and presumptive anti-relapse therapy with
primaquine [5]. Nearly all malaria cases occurring in the
regions south of the DMZ concerned military personnel or
veterans who had stayed in high-risk malaria areas along the
DMZ and returned to their homes, where they later devel-
oped malaria or enabled local transmission by malaria vectors.
Injuries to military personnel are frequently complicated by
infections with multiresistant Gram-negative bacilli, owing
both to environmental contamination and to nosocomial
transmission within the military health facilities in the opera-
tional theatre. After the evacuation of these infected military
patients, the multiresistant microrganisms can spread in mili-
tary hospitals, and thereafter in the civilian population of the
country of origin of soldiers. Widespread carbapenem-resis-
tant Acinetobacter outbreaks have been recorded in USA and
UK from evacuees from Iraq and Afghanistan [6]. Such transfer
of pathogens from endemic areas by military personnel return-
ing from operational theatres can occur without injury. An
outbreak of Panton–Valentine leukocidin-positive Staphylococ-
cus aureus infection was reported in 2004–2005 in French sol-
diers operating in Cote d’Ivoire, and it subsequently spread in
their families. That outbreak and its spread in families was
attributed to the persistence of a highly virulent clone in the
environment of the training camp in Coˆte d’Ivoire, where
hygiene conditions were poor, and to its nasal carriage [7].
More recently, in October 2010, a cholera epidemic caused
by Vibrio cholerae O1, serotype Ogawa, biotype El Tor
occurred in Haiti, 9 months after a major earthquake and
more than a century after the last reported cholera outbreak
in that country. A team of French and Haitian epidemiologists
conducted a spatio-temporal analysis of the incidence of
cholera cases that highlighted five significant clusters, the first
one being next to a United Nations camp that had been occu-
pied since a few weeks by Nepalese soldiers, who were
accused of illegal dumping of waste tank contents. Their find-
ings strongly suggested that the epidemic had its origin in that
military camp with deficient sanitation [8,9]. In addition, a
cholera outbreak had been reported in Nepal’s capital few
weeks before troops moved to Haiti, and the results of
sequencing and typing of dozens of clinical isolates from Haiti,
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Nepal and other parts of the world were consistent with
Nepal as the origin of the Haitian outbreak [10].
The above examples reveal several risk factors that con-
tribute to the involvement of soldiers in the emergence of
epidemics and the spread of pathogens within the civilian
populations. The soldiers may lack immunity and appropriate
control measures against newly encountered endemic patho-
gens in their deployment areas. In the absence of control
and supervision, the military may be tempted to free itself
from the health rules, regulations and laws of the countries
where it is stationed. When military management is weak,
implementation of the hygiene and preventive measures
could be neglected. Overcrowding and poor hygiene condi-
tions could facilitate transmission within the military popula-
tion and amplification of the reservoirs of pathogens. The
mobility and diverse origins of the troops could favour the
spread and mixture of microorganisms from different coun-
tries and the spread of resistance and virulence factors.
The United Nations, African Union and other peacekeep-
ing operations presently involve more than 100 000 uni-
formed personnel through the world, mainly in developing
countries and inter-tropical areas. Most of the contributors
of these troops are low-income and middle-income coun-
tries with armies that can lack trained, experienced and
appropriately equipped military health services. The United
Nations and other international organizations, such as
NATO and the African Union, that mandate such troops
within civilian populations that are weakened by war or
social disorganization have to ensure appropriate health
screening and support of the soldiers, and close monitoring
of potentially epidemic diseases. They must also publicize
their actions and not try to deny the problems. Otherwise,
they risk losing the credibility and acceptability of these
troops, with potentially major political and health implica-
tions. There are not always independent epidemiological
and microbiological capabilities present on-site to detect
and respond to epidemics.
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